I INTRODUCTION
A majority of the United Kingdom (''UK'') Supreme Court 1 magistrates has ruled that the UK Parliament should vote on the European Union (''EU'') Act 2011 2 before the government can invoke Article 50 Treaty on European Union (''TEU'') and formally initiate Brexit through a Great Repeal Bill. 3 This situation means that an Act of Parliament is necessary in order to abrogate the 1972 European Communities Act, although the UK Supreme Court considered the consent of the devolved assemblies in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales unnecessary. The ÔBritish exit' is looming and the world is watching each step taken by the UK in relation to the devolutionary aspects of Brexit according to the British Constitution, 4 which could perhaps serve as a model in the future for some other Member States.
It is no longer a matter of complaining about Brexit 5 or justifying the particularly reluctant attitude of the UK towards unreserved participation in the EU and its probable historical reasons. 6 What it is clear throughout the EU is that Brexit will have significant fallout on the one-to-one relationships between the UK, the EU and all of its Member States, in so far as the UK will no longer be subject to EU Law. Future relations between the UK and Spain will be discussed, against the backdrop of EU Criminal Law. Concern is in fact growing in Spain over the consequences of Brexit, 7 logically enough in view of the evident uncertainty over the post-Brexit future of the EU. 8 This situation is unprecedented, as up until now, countries only have sought entry to the EU.
As mentioned above, 9 the special terms of the UK's accession to the Treaty of Lisbon signed on 13 December 2007, 10 which entered into force on 1 December 2009, in some ways foreshadowed Brexit. It leaves the UK upholding a singular position in the EU scenario, 11 especially in relation to the area of freedom, security and justice (Title V, Arts. 67-89 TFEU, henceforth ''AFSJ''). 12 In fact, the Treaty of 11 See at the time references on Ôexceptionalism' and Ôdifferentiation' in ASFJ by S Carrera and F Geyer, ÔThe Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs: implications for the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice', in E Guild and F Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and judicial cooperation in the European Union (Aldershot and Burlington, Ashgate, 2008) 289 at 303.
12 See, generally, M Fletcher, ÔEU criminal justice beyond Lisbon', in C Eckes and T Konstantinides (eds), Crime within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. A European Public Prosecutor (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 10 as well as E Herlin Karnell, ÔEU competence in Criminal Law after Lisbon', in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) 331.
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Lisbon generally provides a Ômore European' 13 approach establishing some improvements in the area of AFSJ, seen until then as the Ôwicked stepmother of the EU system'; 14 basically, these improvements are: (a) suppression of the earlier structure of the three pillars and the extension of the Ôcommunity method'; (b) unification of the legal sources of EU Law (rulings, directives and decisions); (c) the attachment of a binding effect to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 15 and the extension of ECJ jurisdiction 16 throughout the area of freedom, security and justice. This last matter represents a key point for the British Government in its arguments for leaving Europe.
17
The UK and Ireland both signed Protocols 21 and 36 18 accompanying the Treaty of Lisbon, stressing their particular positions in relation to the AFSJ through the opt-in and opt-out clauses. ' (2013) 23 Europe: actualite´du droit communautaire 6. As said, a Ôresult' of the provision of opt in/out clauses is that the Ôdegree of cooperative participation of the EU Member States in the AFSJ has diminished'; see J de Zwaan, ÔThe new governance of Justice and Home Affairs: towards further supranationalism' in S Wolff, F A N J Goudappel and J de Zwaan (eds), Freedom, security and justice after Lisbon and Stockholm (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2011) 7 at 24.
MAR JIMENO-BULNES
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Besides, the UK has benefited from transitional measures for over five years, thereby circumventing the jurisdiction of the ECJ in relation to the AFSJ; this period finished on 1 December 2014, the date on which the UK communicated a list of acts into which it wished to Ôopt back' 20 . The whole situation created a sort of Ôjustice al a carte' 21 of benefit to the UK; presaging once again what is now a very real debate over Brexit, that is, the potential loss of national sovereignty including the independence of the British criminal justice system.
22
In this context, the specific consequences of Brexit in Spain will be analysed in relation to EU Criminal Law policy. The present inquiry will address three different areas: the institutional area, judicial cooperation in application of the principle of mutual recognition, and the area of procedural rights in application of the principle of approximation of law. It is time for Spain to Ôreinvent' its relationship with the UK outside the EU framework. . 26 According to s. 6 (5) (c) EU Act 2011 an Act by the UK Parliament and a referendum are required. 27 The main agencies in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters are the liaison magistrates, the European Judicial Network and Eurojust. See M L Escalada Lo´pez, ÔLos instrumentos de cooperacio´n judicial europea: hacia una futura fiscalı´a europea', above n 23; also id, ÔInstrumentos orga´nicos: en especial, redes judiciales europea en materia civil, mercantil y penal', in M Jimeno Bulnes (ed), Nuevas aportaciones al espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia. Hacia un Derecho Procesal europeo de naturaleza civil y penal (Granada, Comares, 2014) 47-81 and ÔInstru-mentos orga´nicos de cooperacio´n judicial: magistrados de enlace, red judicial europea y Eurojust' in M Jimeno Bulnes (ed), La cooperacio´n judicial civil y penal en el a´mbito de la Unio´n Europea: instrumentos procesales (Barcelona: Bosch, 2007) 95. Extensively N Alonso Moreda, La dimensio´n institucional de la cooperacio´n judicial en materia penal en la Unio´n Europea: magistrados de enlace, Red Judicial Europea y Eurojust (San Sebastia´n, Universidad del Paı´s Vasco, 2010). 28 It should be remembered that two of four presidents of Eurojust were British, including the inaugural one (Mike Kennedy) and the current director of Europol (Rob Wainwright) is also from the UK. See information provided on the Interpol posal and numerous seminars as well as publications have been held on the matter over recent years. This fact is relevant for Spain, because it has always exchanged liaison magistrates with the UK in the past, as an essential mechanism for procedures such as the issuance and enforcement of European Arrest Warrants (''EAW'') in line with judicial practice. 36 Spain also maintains liaison magistrates in France and Italy, countries with which Spain, as with the UK, has a constant flow of Ôrogatory letters' (comisiones rogatorias) in request for judicial assistance; at the moment the appropriate judicial authorities are Benedict Leonard, the UK liaison magistrate, and Miguel Carmona, the Spanish liaison magistrate. But Spain also exchanges liaison magistrates with non-EU countries such as Morocco 37 in so far as this possibility is recognized specifically in the Spanish Law 16/2006, on 26 May, by which the Statute of the National Member of Eurojust is regulated and the relations with this organ of the EU; in concrete, the possibility is foreseen of establishing positions for liaison magistrates according to ÔEU Law, international treaties and reciprocity'. 38 As for other countries, this option will also apply to the UK when and if it becomes a third state outside of the EU.
II INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCIES
The example provided by Eurojust is a further argument in favour of such a position in this context. In fact, the College of Eurojust at 35 44 In fact, the UK had already announced its agreement to that change and its wish to accept the EIO, 45 but the proximity of Brexit means that its transposition and practical application is more than unlikely. 45 See list of acts adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation which have been amended by an act applicable to the United Kingdom adopted after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and which therefore remain applicable to the United Kingdom as amended or replaced, 2014/C 430/04, above n 20. 46 See Mitsilegas, The uneasy relationship between the UK and European Criminal Law: from opt-outs to Brexit?', above n 9 at 530, regretting its abandonment. 47 (1998) . 49 The UK placed mutual recognition on the agenda as an alternative to legislative harmonization, the common minimum standards of which are to date unavoidable in EU territory. 50 The harmonization process threatened to compromise the continuance of the Common Law system in EU Law as the majority of the then 15 Member States follow the Civil Law system. 51 The UK revolutionized the field of European judicial cooperation with this project, drawn from the well-known judgment of Cassis de Dijon 52 . The application of the principle of mutual recognition in the EU judicial area opened the door to a sort of free circulation of judicial decisions, which became the fifth community freedom or, for others, the roaming 53 of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. drug-trafficking cases; while the former are especially related to Spain, the latter are more likely to relate to UK. 63 Concerning terrorism cases in Spain where an EAW is issued to the UK, judicial practice following the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid may be mentioned; 64 here, some of the accused were handed over by the UK to be tried in Spain. In concrete, the British judicial authorities deported the suspect under the alias ÔBotines' on 15 April 2006 to Spain, where he had been convicted on July 2003. The EAW issued by Spanish Central Judge of the Investigative was issued on 12 August 2004, but there were requests from the UK for additional information relating to the facts and the dates on which the crimes were committed; hence the delay in the enforcment of the EAW. 65 Despite his acquittal, due to the application of the exclusionary rule (prueba ilıćita) in relation to telephone tapping authorised by the courts in Spain, the execution of the EAW was essential in order to ensure the presence of the accused at the trial, which would not otherwise have been held under Spanish procedural rules. 
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Although bilateral cooperation between the UK and Spain on EAW generally functions quite well (especially, as said, in relation to matters of terrorism), 67 there are however cases in which an EAW issued by Spanish judge or court 68 is not enforced by the British judicial authorities. In these cases, the only solution it is to employ the traditional instruments of mutual assistance such as, the delivery of an international arrest warrant; hence, the warrant issued on 13 August 2015 by the Central Judge of the Investigative no 5, 69 in which a Ôletter rogatory' requested international judicial assistance, following the failure of an earlier EAW issued by same Central Judge of the Investigative on 17 November 2014. The EAW in question had in fact been upheld in the first instance by a Senior District Judge, but had then been revoked on appeal before the High Court of Justice (Queen's Bench Division).
70
The likely solution after Brexit, if it is the case that EAW proceedings between UK and Member States cease, could be to resort to bilateral agreements, in order to establish fast-track surrender treaties. Previous bilateral fast-track surrender treaties might be recalled, enacted before the adoption of EAW, such as those between Italy and The UK has been less encouraging in relation to the adoption of measures on the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals and their procedural rights. 73 To some extent, the UK considers that Ôhuman rights law emanating from Europe', or EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters, Ôhinders extradition', 74 which is obviously not the case as long as both areas are Ôinherently' connected. 75 In this context, since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has gradually increased the protection of individual rights; 76 the best example being the adoption of the so-called Roadmap for strength- ening procedural rights of suspects or accused persons in criminal proceedings 77 in 2009 providing minimum rules in this area. In fact, the UK agreed to the first measures adopted in 2010 and 2012 in the field of interpretation and translation and in relation to the right to information in criminal proceedings. 78 In contrast, the UK has shown little inclination to participate in any further regulation on procedural rights, since the enactment of Directive 2013/48/ EU of 22 October 2013 on the Right of Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings. 79 Its decision is borne out by its voting record on this initiative in the Council of the EU, 80 as well as those related to further regulation on the presumption of innocence, procedural safeguards for children, and legal aid. 81 The thorniest issue in the previous Proposal for a Council FD on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings throughout the EU launched by the European Commission in 2004 was precisely the right to legal counsel. 82 This right is contemplated throughout police questioning according to the Salduz doctrine, 83 which up until now was not provided for in all national legislations in the Member States. 84 In the UK, some exceptions are also expressly contemplated in relation to serious offences such as terrorism according to Art. 56 PACE, 85 which has been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights (''ECtHR''). 86 Hence, its alignment with the group of countries (Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia) that at the time defended the sufficiency of Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR for the protection of the procedural rights of suspects and/or accused persons in criminal proceedings. 87 However, numerous examples of case-law pronounced in Strasbourg have censured EU Member States (including the UK and Spain) for the violation of procedural rights. 88 Spain also has its own experiences of failing to comply with the procedural rights recognized in the new directives. Not surprisingly, it has also experienced important issues in relation to the enforcement of certain procedural rights of suspected persons held in police detention, 89 92 has upheld that direct effect in response to an appeal for relief (amparo) from a Spanish citizen, whose lawyer was denied access to a police report on his questioning; the citizen in question was arrested on 11 June 2014, some days after the deadline of 2 June 2014 set for the transposition of the Directive according to its Art. 11 (1).
V CONCLUDING REMARKS
At the time of writing Theresa May has triggered Art. 50 TEU by way of a formal letter sent to Council President Donald Tusk. 93 The proceedings in the British Parliament to invoke Art. 50 TFEU for the withdrawal of the UK from the EU are fully underway. 94 Significant concern has already been raised about the consequences of Brexit in different areas and not only in European Criminal Law. This is the case, for example, of EU citizens living in UK, 95 to whom a sort of permanent residency has been unsuccessfully proposed; 96 and viceversa, for the millions of UK nationals residing in EU countries, especially in the south of Europe, and particularly in southern Spain. 97 There are grave concerns in the UK over two main topics in relation to European Criminal Law policy according to two reports prepared by the UK Parliament of December 2016. One is the UK-UE security goal to be achieved through police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters with the maintenance of British participation in EU agencies, if possible, and the provision of alternatives to mutual recognition instruments. 98 In the case of participation in agencies, the UK is especially interested in maintaining cooperation with Europol and Eurojust; in relation to the latter, it is examining the roles of Norwegian, Swiss and American liaison magistrates posted by their respective countries that are not EU members as mentioned earlier.
99
In the case of mutual recognition instruments, the main objective is certainly to maintain an instrument as close as possible to the EAW, which, as stated, Ôis a critical component of the UK's law enforcement capabilities'. 100 After exploring other options, 101 it looks as though the best alternative will be to substitute the EAW by the provision of bilateral extradition agreements similar to those that exist between both Norway and Iceland and the EU. 102 There is also the possibility of signing Ôfast-track surrender' bilateral treaties, similar to those that previously existed between UK and Spain, in 2001, before the EAW. Nevertheless, there are doubts over the efficiency of each solution with regard to the grounds for refusal that may be added (e.g., nationality).
In contrast, the future of the second topic is much more uncertain, as is the protection of fundamental (and procedural) rights. As previously mentioned, there is great controversy over the residence rights of EU nationals currently in the UK and UK nationals in EU 103 and there are major concerns over any sort of fundamental rights guaranteed under EU Law. The fear is that the new government will reduce some of the fundamental rights (although it is unclear which ones) acquired under EU Law; 104 besides, the guidance by way of new directives on procedural rights and CJEU case law will be lacking. All in all, it has been argued that the so-called Great Repeal Bill should maintain Ôany fundamental rights, which UK citizens currently possess under EU Law'.
Finally, the temporal coincidence of the Brexit process with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome on March 27th is worthwhile noting. 105 The UK may reconsider the risks of leaving the EU or at least review the real consequences. Whatever the future holds for the EU, with or without the UK, can be summarized in President Donald Tusk's letter to the 27 heads of remaining Member States before the Malta summit last February 3rd, 2017: ÔUnited we stand, divided we fall'; 106 equally applicable to European Criminal Law.
